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OSHA's Rulemaking Authority Under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act: Marshall v.
American Petroleum Institute
INTRODUCTION

American workers today face increasing dangers from exposure
to toxic and hazardous substances which are commonly found in
the workplace.' The responsibility for regulating the use of dangerous substances in the working environment is vested in the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). 2 Under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act,3 the Secretary of Labor is
given broad authority to promulgate and enforce health and safety
regulations." OSHA regulations, particularly those dealing with
1. Nationwide surveys show that 20 to 25% of all workers are exposed to serious safety
and health hazards. R. QUINN AND G. STAINES, THE 1977 QUALITY OF EMPLOYMENT SURVEY
(Ann Arbor, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan).
2. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration was established by the Secretary
of Labor to administer the Occupational Safety and Health Act. 36 Fed. Reg. 8,754 (1971)
[hereinafter referred to as "OSHA" or "the Agency"].
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as "OSHA" or "the Act"]. §
651(b) provides:
The Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy, through the exercise of its
power to regulate commerce among the several States and with foreign nations
and to provide for the general welfare, to assure so far as possible every working
man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources ....
See Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (the protection of health of employees is the overriding concern of OSHA).
The Act was passed in response to mounting concern over alarming industrial accident
statistics and health problems in the American workplace. While Congress was considering
the Act, it was reported that in the previous four years more Americans had been killed on
the job than in Vietnam, that industrial accidents disabled more than two million people
per year, and that approximately 390,000 persons were victims of occupational disease. See
S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5178-79.
4. An occupational safety and health standard is "a standard which requires conditions,
or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes,
reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of
employment." 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976).
Each employer must comply with two provisions of the Act. First, § 5(a)(1) requires the
employer to furnish employment and a place of employment "free from recognized hazards
that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm . . . " 29 U.S.C. §
654(a)(1) (1976). Second, § 5(a)(2) of the Act requires the employer to comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated under the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2) (1976).
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toxic and hazardous substances, 5 have been challenged and harshly
criticized by industry.' Upon challenge,7 the courts have generally
The types of standards established by the Act are "interim" standards, "permanent" standards, and "emergency temporary" standards. 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1976).
OSHA's specific duty to regulate toxic or harmful substances, including carcinogens, is
covered in 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976), which provides:
The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful
physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence,
that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity
even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his working life. Development of standards under this subsection shall be based upon research, demonstrations, experiments, and such other
information as may be appropriate. In addition to the attainment of the highest
degree of health and safety protection for the employee, other considerations shall
be the latest available scientific data in the field, the feasibility of the standards,
and experience gained under this and other health and safety laws. Whenever
practicable, the standard promulgated shall be expressed in terms of objective criteria and of the performance desired.
A carcinogen is a substance, chemical, physical, or biological, which increases the incidence of cancer. A controversy exists as to whether carcinogenicity should include excess
incidences of both benign and malignant tumors, or only malignant ones. The generally accepted view is to include both benign and malignant tumors. See Kraus, Environmental
Carcinogenisis:Regulation on the Frontiers of Science, 7 ENV. L. 83 (1976) for a discussion
of the unique problems in effective regulatory control of carcinogens.
5. In its nine year history, OSHA has concluded only seven rulemaking proceedings in
regulating carcinogens. These include: (1) asbestos, contested and upheld in Indus. Union
Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The cancer causing properties of
asbestos were not, however, used as a basis for the promulgated standard. (2) a group of 14
carcinogens, contested in part and vacated as emergency temporary standards in Dry Color
Mfrs.' Ass'n v. Dep't of Labor, 486 F.2d 98 (3rd Cir. 1973); contested and affirmed in part as
permanent standards in Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs.' Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155
(3rd Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975); and contested and affirmed in part in
Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs.' Ass'n v. Brennan, 506 F.2d 385 (3rd Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 830 (1975). (3) vinyl chloride, contested and upheld in Society of the Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975). (4) cokeoven emissions, contested and upheld in Am. Iron and Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825
(3rd Cir. 1978), petition for cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 3054 (1980). On August 26, 1980 the
American Iron and Steel Institute withdrew its petition to the Supreme Court. See 10 OccuPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REPORTER (BNA) 358 (1980). (5) benzene, contested and vacated in Am. Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd, Marshall v.
American Petroleum Inst., 48 U.S.L.W. 5022 (1980). (6) acrylonitrile. The permanent standard has not been judicially contested. (7) inorganic arsenic, challenged as a permanent
standard in ASARCO v. OSHA, No.- (9th Cir. _), judicial review pending the Supreme
Court decision on the benzene standard. Final standards are still pending for beryllium.
Only two other health standards have been promulgated during the history of OSHA: standards regulating occupational exposures to inorganic lead and cotton dust. The cotton dust
standard was contested and affirmed in AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
petition for cert. granted, - U.S. -(1980).
6. OSHA, having created literally thousands of safety standards, 29 C.F.R. § 1910 et seq.
(1979), has been criticized by industry for "petty" regulation. Under the Carter Administration, the Agency promised to change its focus from the regulation of petty safety hazards to
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deferred to OSHA's technical expertise and have upheld hazardous
substance regulations.8
This tradition of judicial deference, however, has been signifi-

the control of toxic and hazardous substances. 6 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND

HEALTH RE-

(BNA) 1587 (1977). In an October, 1980 address to the Chemical Manufacturers'
Association, OSHA Administrator, Eula Bingham, stated that while the Agency had come
an enormous distance in protecting workers in the last 10 years, worker protection from
toxic substances will become even more important in the 1980's. Bingham predicted that
over the next decade industry attitudes toward worker protection will change, more protection from toxic substances will be built into industrial plants in the form of enclosed systems, and that OSHA standards will become process rather than substance oriented. 10
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REPORTER (BNA) 600 (1980).
OSHA's shift to serious occupational health threats is in keeping with at least one aspect
of congressional concern expressed in the legislative history:
Occupational diseases which first commanded attention at the beginning of the
Industrial Revolution are still undermining the health of workers. Substantial
numbers, even today, fall victim to ancient industrial poisons such as lead and
mercury. Workers in the dusty trades still contract various respiratory diseases.
Other materials long in industrial use are only now being discovered to have toxic
effects. In addition, technological advances and new processes in American industry have brought numerous new hazards to the workplace. Carcinogenic chemicals,
lassers, ultrasonic energy, beryllium metal, epoxy resins, pesticides, among others,
all present incipient threats to the health of workers. Indeed, new materials and
processes are being introduced into industry at a much faster rate than the present meager resources of occupational health can keep up with. It is estimated
that every 20 minutes a new and potentially toxic chemical is introduced into industry. New processes and new sources of energy present occupational health
problems of unprecedented complexity.
S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5177-78.
A major criticism of OSHA has been the alleged increases in costs of production. Critics
say that OSHA imposes high costs but provides few or no benefits. For a discussion indicating that the law has not had the exaggerated cost impact its critics have charged, but has
had some measurable positive impacts, see Ginnold, A View of the Costs and Benefits of
the Job Safety and Health Act, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR BUREAU OF
PORTER

LABOR STATISTICS

(August, 1980).

29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976) provides:
Any person who may be adversely affected by a standard issued under this section
may at any time prior to the sixtieth day after such standard is promulgated file a
petition challenging the validity of such standard with the United States court of
appeals for the circuit wherein such person resides or has his principal place of
business, for a judicial review of such standard. A copy of the petition shall be
forthwith transmitted by the clerk of the court to the Secretary. The filing of such
petition shall not, unless otherwise ordered by the court, operate as a stay of the
standard. The determinations of the Secretary shall be conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole.
8. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, - U.S. _1980);
Am. Iron and Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3rd Cir. 1978), petition for cert. granted,
100 S. Ct. 3054 (1980); Society of the Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1978); Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d
467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
7.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 12

cantly undermined by the Supreme Court in Marshall v. American
Petroleum Institute." In Marshall, the Court invalidated OSHA's
permanent standard governing worker exposure to benzene.' ° The
Court declared that prior to the issuance of a permanent standard,
the Secretary of Labor must find "that the toxic substance in question poses a significant health risk in the workplace, and that a
new, lower standard is threfore 'reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment.'""
The Supreme Court's opinion in Marshall has great significance
for future OSHA regulation of toxic substances and carcinogens.
The newly articulated threshold requirement imposes a stringent
evidentiary burden upon OSHA which could severely limit the
Agency's future ability to regulate toxic substances. Furthermore,
the Marshall decision undermines OSHA's authority to assure the
highest degree of health and safety protection as well as its authority to promulgate standards based upon policy judgments when

9. 48 U.S.L.W. 5022 (1980). The Court characterized the case as "an unusually important case of first impression." Id. at 5024.
10. Id. at 5022. OSHA's benzene standard required employers to assure that no employee be exposed to an airborne concentration of benzene in excess of one part benzene per
million parts of air ( 1 ppm ) averaged over an eight hour day. It required employers to
assure that no employee be exposed to dermal contact with liquid benzene, excluding liquid
mixtures containing 0.5% or less benzene (and after a 3 year grace period, 0.1%), and imposed labeling, monitoring, and medical testing requirements, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1028 (1979).
Benzene is a hydrocarbon compound (C.H.) manufactured for many industrial uses. It is
a colorless, aromatic liquid that evaporates rapidly under ordinary atmospheric conditions.
Eleven billion pounds of benzene were produced in the United Staes in 1976, 94% by the
petroleum refining and petrochemical industries and 6% by the steel industry. Benzene's
primary use is in the manufacture of other organic chemicals, as well as motor fuels, solvents, detergents, paints and pesticides. 43 Fed. Reg. 5918 (1978). Industries currently using
benzene include the petroleum, coking operations, chemical processing, printing, lithograph,
rubber, paint, varnish, stain remover, and adhesives industries. 43 Fed. Reg. 5935 (1978).
Benzene is an acknowledged toxic substance whose principal risk of harm comes from inhalation of its vapors. When benzene vapors are inhaled, the benzene diffuses rapidly
through the lungs and is quickly absorbed into the blood. Exposure to high concentrations
produces an almost immediate effect on the central nervous system. Inhalations of concentrations of 20,000 ppm can be fatal; exposure to milder, though still high concentrations of
benzene (250-500 ppm) can cause vertigo, nervous excitation, headache, nausea, and breathlessness. 43 Fed. Reg. 5921 (1978).
Benzene's acute and chronic nonmalignant effects have been recggnized since 1900. The
most common nonmalignant effects of chronic exposure to low concentration levels (2540ppm) are non-functioning bone marrow and deficiencies in the formed elements of the
blood, i.e. reduced red blood cell count (anemia), reduced white blood cell count (leukopenia), and reduced platelet count (thrombocytopenia). Chromosomal aberrations have also
been associated with chronic benzene exposure, and dermatitis and other dermal infections
can be caused by bodily contact with liquid benzene. 43 Fed. Reg. 5924-25 (1978).
11. Marshall v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 48 U.S.L.W. 5022, 5024 (1980).
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factual findings are methodologically deficient, unavailable, or
inconclusive.
This article will review the rulemaking framework within which
OSHA regulates the use of toxic substances in the workplace. In
this regard, pre-Marshall circuit court decisions dealing with
OSHA's hazardous substance regulations will be discussed. Finally,
this article will focus on Marshall v. American Petroleum Institute, and demonstrate the manner in which this decision limits
OSHA's future ability to regulate the use of hazardous substances
in the workplace.
BACKGROUND:

OSHA

REGULATION OF

ToxiC

AND HAZARDOUS

SUBSTANCES IN THE WORKPLACE

OSHA's Rulemaking Procedure
Pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Secretary of Labor is authorized to issue permanent health standards
which are "reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or
healthful employment and places of employment.""2 When the
Secretary determines that a permanent standard should be issued
or revised, 3 the proposed rule is published in the Federal Register,
followed by public opportunity for written comment within 30
days of publication. 14 OSHA procedure allows for public hearings
upon request of interested parties filing written objections to the
proposed rule.1 5 The "rulemaking record," 6 which OSHA uses to
12. 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976).
13. This determination may arise as a result of information provided by an "interested
person," an employer, an employee organization, a national standards organization, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (formerly H.E.W., see 20 U.S.C. §
3508), the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), or a state or
political subdivision. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(1976). The Secretary may, but need not, request
from an advisory committee with both labor and management representation a recommendation with respect to a standard. See Nat'l Roofing Contractors Ass'n v. Brennan, 495 F.2d
1294, 1296-97 (7th Cir. 1974), where "improper" committee composition was unsuccessfully
challenged as grounds for invalidation of the regulation. Appointment of an advisory committee is optional and its recommendations are only advisory.
14. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(2) (1976). This procedure is often referred to as informal or "notice and comment" rulemaking, analogous to § 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 553 (1976). OSHA itself is a self-contained statute and does not depend upon reference to the Administrative Procedure Act for specifications of procedures to be followed.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(3) (1976). A public oral hearing is generally only required in formal rulemaking procedures. The public hearing requirement is not satisfied by the mere
"notice and comment" requirement since the section provides that the Secretary designate a
time and a place for the hearing. Id. But see United States v. Florida East Coast Rwy. Co.,
410 U.S. 224 (1973) (word "hearing" alone does not require that a formal hearing be held
but may be satisfied by notice and comment).
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support the permanent standard, is comprised of comments and
exhibits received prior to the hearing, the written and oral testimony of the hearing participants, and the post-hearing comments
17
and briefs.
Within 60 days after the hearing, the Secretary issues the permanent standard,"8 along with a statement indicating which data
in the rulemaking record is being relied upon, why the data shows
that the substance is harmful, and why the particular standards
were chosen to correct the unsafe condition.1 9 In addition, if a permanent rule differs substantially from a pre-existing standard, the
Secretary must give reasons why the revised standards will better
effectuate the purposes of the Act.2 The Act further provides that
any person who is adversely affected by the newly issued standard

The earlier House bill version of the Act provided for formal rulemaking, i.e. a trial type
hearing, but it was abandoned in favor the Senate version, which has lead to characterization of the hearing as legislative and not "quasi-judicial." See Assoc. Indus. v. Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 348-49 (2d Cir. 1973); Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d
467, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1974); 29 C.F.R. § 1911.15(a)(1-2) (1979). A regulation promulgated by
the Secretary of Labor requires that a qualified hearing officer preside over the oral hearing
and that the examiner allow for cross-examination on crucial issues. 29 C.F.R. §
1911.15(b)(1-2) (1979). A verbatim transcript of the hearing is made, so overall the hearings
are more formal than the traditional rulemaking process. Id. at (b)(3).
16. Formal rulemaking procedures provide a detailed record upon which courts can conduct a review. This record, typically consisting of documents (letters, studies, reports, and
statements) and hearing transcripts, becomes the sole basis on which the reviewing court
may determine if the rule is supported by "substantial evidence." 4 K. DAVIS. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.03 (1958).
17. It is anomalous that the record is in part created under the conditions of a formal
proceeding, but also consists of "materials received outside the bounds of the oral hearing
and untested by anything approaching the adversary proess." Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO
v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Reflecting the legislative nature of informal
rulemaking, the record often does not formally display the full range of considerations
before the Agency when the decision to issue a standard was made. Pedersen, Formal
Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 62 (1975). This article discusses the
internal processes of the Environmental Protection Agency in developing a rulemaking record. The article is also valuable in its creative approach to rulemaking procedure.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(4) (1976).
19. This requirement is fleshed out by a regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1911, 18(b) (1979), which
provides:
Any rule or standard ..
shall incorporate a concise general statement of its basis
and purpose. The statement is not required to include specific and detailed findings and conclusions of the kind customarily associated with formal proceedings.
However, the statement will show the significant issues which have been faced,
and will articulate the rationale for their solution.
The Secretary is not required to file findings of fact, but is required to give a statement of
reasons which may include policy determinations as well as factual findings. Synthetic Organic Chemical Mfrs. Assoc. v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155 (3rd Cir. 1974).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(8) (1976).
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may petition the court for judicial review. 1
Judicial Review of OSHA Action: Traditional Deference to
OSHA Regulation
A court of appeals,2 2 in reviewing an OSHA standard, must determine whether the Secretary acted within the scope of authority
granted to him by the Act.2 Section 6(f) of the Act provides that
"the determinations of the Secretary shall be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence 24 in the record considered as a
whole. ' 25 While this provision establishes a strong presumption of
rule validity, the court must still find that the Agency's rulemaking
21. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976).
22. In keeping with an increasing congressional tendency, 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) provides for
direct review of safety and health standards in the United States Courts of Appeals. See
Currie and Goodman, JudicialReview of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L.R. 1, 39-54 (1975). This provision has been praised as placing
OSHA "in the forefront of more meaningful rulemaking procedure and more efficient judicial review." Currie, OSHA, 4 AM.B. FOUND. RES. J. 1107, 1160 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Currie].
23. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); City of Chicago v.
F.P.C., 458 F.2d 731, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Automative Parts and Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd,
407 F.2d 330, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
24. The insertion of the "substantial evidence" standard of review, customarily associated with formal rulemaking, was a deliberate legislative compromise between the House
and Senate versions of the original bill to provide for review that would be more stringent
than the traditional and narrower "arbitrary and capricious" or "rationality" standard usually associated with informal rulmaking. In Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson,
Judge McGowan explained this anomalous combination as follows:
The substantial evidence test has customarily been directed to adjudicatory proceedings or formal rulemaking. The hybrid nature of OSHA in this respect can be
explained historically, if not logically, as a legislative compromise. The Conference
Report reflects that the Senate bill called for informal rulemaking, but the House
version specified formal rulemaking and substantial evidence review. The House
receded on the procedure for promulgating standards, but the substantial evidence standard of review was adopted.
499 F.2d 467, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1974). For a more detailed discussion of these legislative events,
see Associated Indus. of N.Y. State v. Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1973).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 655(0 (1976).
In addition to pre-enforcement review, the validity of a standard may also be challenged
in defending an enforcement proceeding. See S. REP No. 1281, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. - (1970)
reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5177, 5184, where the report reads:
"While this [§ 655 (f)] would be the exclusive method for obtaining pre-enforcement judicial
review of a standard, the provision does not foreclose an employer from challenging the
validity of a standard during an enforcement proceeding." See Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores,
Inc. v. OSHRC, 534 F.2d 541, 551-52, (3rd Cir. 1976), where the court held that the scope of
review was narrower in an enforcement proceeding than upon direct review, and that the
affirmative defense of invalidity requires an employer to produce evidence that the regulation is "arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or contrary to law." See also, Arkansas Best
Freight Systems, Inc. v. OSHRC, 529 F.2d 649, 653 (8th Cir. 1976).
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record contains adequate support for its regulation.2" Pre-Marshall
decisions relied on the "substantial evidence" standard in deciding
whether to uphold or strike down an OSHA regulation. Although
judicial review necessitates an extensive evaluation of the informal
rulemaking record, such record in toxic substance regulation is
often not well-suited for judicial scrutiny. An understanding of the
difficulties inherent in the judicial process of reviewing OSHA regulations is guided by the consideration of three matters: the courtagency relationship, the substantial evidence standard, and the
pre-Marshall decisions.
The Court-Agency Relationship
Congress has engaged administrative agencies and the courts in
a "partnership" designed to further the public interest and to ensure reasoned decision-making.2 7 Disagreement exists, however,
over the courts' role in reviewing agency regulations.2 8 Recent decisions favor a "hard look" approach by a court in reviewing both

26. The argument has also been made that this provision strongly suggests that the reviewing court is limited to matters that were brought out in the rulemaking proceeding. See
Currie, note 22 supra, at 1129.
27. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 349 U.S. 474, 488 (1951); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,
541 F.2d 1, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); Associated Indus. of
N.Y. v. Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 354 (2nd Cir. 1973) ("With the agencies and the courts
in a new form of uneasy partnership . . . the former must take reasonable steps to enable
the latter to carry out the tasks that Congress has imposed upon them."); Int'l Harvester
Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 647, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (court's role in judicial review
embraces that of constructive co-operation with the agency involved in furtherance of public
interest); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 587 (D.C. Cir.
1971) ("We stand on the threshold of a new era in the history of the long and fruitful
collaboration of administrative agencies and reviewing courts.")
28. The debate has centered on positions taken by Judges Bazelon and Leventhal of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Judge Bazelon, believing that substantial evidence
review of scientific evidence by "technically illiterate judges is dangerously unreliable," espouses that good procedures ensure good substance, and would have the courts scrutinize
only the agency process. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66-67 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J.
concurring) cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). In Ethyl Corp., Judge Bazelon states: "The
process [of] making a de novo evaluation of the scientific evidence inevitably invites judges
of opposing views to make plausible-sounding, but simplistic, judgments of the relative
weight to be afforded various pieces of technical data." Id. at 66.
Judge Leventhal, on the other hand, believes that the court should take a "hard look" at
both the substance and procedure of an agency's decision, "to penetrate to the underlying
decisions of the agency, to satisfy itself that the agency has exercised a reasoned discretion
with reasons that do not deviate from or ignore the ascertainable legislative intent." Greater
Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
923 (1971).
For more extensive treatment of this subject, see Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal
Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. R. 185 (1974).
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procedures and substantive issues involved in agency action. 29
The court, in its review of an agency regulation, must look to the
precise record that the agency considered. 0 In promulgating a
standard, OSHA may not go beyond the record."1 To assist the
court in its review of the record, the agency specifies which factual
evidence and policy considerations it relied upon in adopting a regulation.32 This requires explication of the assumptions underlying
predictions" and the basis for the agency's resolution of conflicts
34
and ambiguities.
The role of the court, however, is not clearly defined in instances
where an agency's action is based primarily upon policy and inconclusive evidence. This lack of a definitive judicial role is particularly apparent in OSHA regulation of toxic substances. Such regulation is frequently promulgated on conflicting and inconclusive
findings by OSHA and industry experts. Agency regulation of
health and safety must often be based upon policy judgments
rather than scientific facts.3 5 The Agency, in formulating toxic and

29. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519 (1978). In Vermont Yankee, the Court emphatically rejected Judge Bazelon's
narrow view that appropriate procedures can assure a "correct" result. The Court also
stated that reviewing courts cannot require procedures more formal than those authorized
by statute, although it did acknowledge the rare possibibity of circumstances that might
justify reversal of an agency action because of failure to use procedures beyond those required by statute. Id. at 542. See also Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 (1976) ("The
only role for a reviewing court is to insure that the agency has taken a 'hard look' at envi"); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
ronmental consequences ....
402, 416 (1971); Envirnomental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
30. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971); NLRB v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 443-44 (1965); Burlington Truck Lines v. United
States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1962).
31. Cf. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel, 406 U.S. 742, 756-57 (1972) (in review,
the court may not consider post-hoc rationalization of counsel or agency members, nor evidentiary materials that were not considered by the agency).
32. "The administrator may apply his expertise to draw conclusions from suspected, but
not completely substantiated relationships between facts, from trends among facts. . . from
probative preliminary data not yet certifiable as 'fact,' and the like." Ethyl Corp v. EPA,
541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
33. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 651 n.64 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, - U.S.
-(1980); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 67 (D.C. Cir.1976) (Bazelon, J., concurring); See
also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943).
34. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
35. Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1974):
But in a statute like OSHA, where the decision making vested in the Secretary is
legislative in character, there are areas where explicit factual findings are not possible, and the act of decision is essentially a prediction based upon pure legislative
judgment as when a Congressman decides to vote for or against a particular bill.
See also Society of the Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1975),
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hazardous substance regulations, cannot be expected to resolve scientific questions which the scientific community itself has been unable to answer. Thus, courts have recognized that certain regulations must be predicated in part on legislative policy choices if the
Agency is to take any action." Accordingly, an agency such as
OSHA has some leeway where its findings must be made on "the
frontiers of scientific knowledge.

87

The extent of the margin per-

mitted by a reviewing court will determine whether agency action
is affirmed or rejected.
Judicial review of OSHA's record is difficult, if not meaningless,
to the extent that the record contains more generalized than specific information, to the extent that it does not contain information
tested by cross-examination, and insofar as it contains merely conclusory information based on data gathered by interested parties. 88
The Agency's broad authority to promulgate toxic and harmful
substance regulations is undefined and will shift under the scrutiny
of a reviewing court. A court that favors conclusive findings of fact
and demands scientific certainty is not likely to affirm policy-dominated regulations. A court, however, that defers to the balancing of
interests and the relative risks of underprotection versus overprotection, as characterized the Agency's legislative judgments, is
more likely to uphold the Agency's regulation. The court's view
and application of the substantial evidence test will often be determinative of whether an OSHA safety regulation will be affirmed or
rejected.
The Substantial Evidence Test
In reviewing OSHA standards, the court is required to sustain
only those standards which are supported by substantial evidence
in the record as a whole.8" The "substantial evidence" standard of
cert. denied 421 U.S. 922 (1975).
36. For an extensive discussion of the difficulties inherent in regulating carcinogens and
the consequent necessity of making policy choices because of many unanswered questions,
see McGarity, Substantive and ProceduralDiscretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEo. L. J. 729
(1979).
37. Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1974). This
granting of leeway is further reinforced by the precise language of 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5),
which allows OSHA to regulate on the basis of the "best available evidence."
38. City of Chicago v. Federal Power Comm'n, 458 F.2d 731, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976). Other Congressional statutes that have designated the
stringent substantial evidence test for judicial review of an informal rulemaking proceeding
are Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(3)(A) (1976),
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judicial review falls between the broad and intrusive "clearly erroneous" test"0 and the narrow and deferential "arbitrary and capricious" test."' The standard is codified in the Administrative Procedures Act 4 1 and has a long and confused history. Originally, the

substantial evidence test was applied literally to mean that the evidence supporting an agency regulation must be substantial. s The
test has since been refined to entail a reasonable weighing of both
the supportive and countervailing evidence underlying the
Agency's decision. 4
In Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, 5 the Supreme
Court defined the substantial evidence test as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.46 The Court recognized that even though inconsistent
Consumer Products Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2060(c) (1976), and Toxic Substances Control
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(c)(1)(B)(i) (1976).
40. The "clearly erroneous" standard of review allows a reviewing court to reverse a trial
court or administrative agency when the reviewing court takes a contrary view of the evidence even though there is evidence to support the finding. 4 K.DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 29.02 (1958). The Supreme Court has explained the test as follows: "A finding is
'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
41. See K. Davis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES §§ 29.01-2 (1976). The "arbitrary and capricious" test is codified in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(A) (1976). Until the last decade, this was the standard of review typically applied to
informal rulemaking. This standard is a highly deferential one which presumes that agency
action is valid, but allows the court to strike agency action found to be "arbitrary, capricious,. . . [or] an abuse of discretion." May Trucking Co. v. United States, 593 F.2d 1349,
1352 (D.C. Cir. 1979). It remains a basic standard of review along with other criteria of
legality and constitutionality even when the substantial evidence test applies. Id.
42. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976). The "substantial evidence" test in the APA and in other
agency contexts is associated with formal rulemaking proceedings. A formal rulemaking proceeding is an adversarial proceeding much like a common law trial in which the parties
present their positions to an administrative judge. The parties may present oral and documentary evidence and cross-examine witnesses. The transcript of testimony, exhibits, and

documents comprise the sole record from which the administrative law judge must make a
determination. The same record is the exclusive basis upon which the reviewing court determines if a rule is supported by substantial evidence.
43. The evidence in support of a fact finding is "substantial" when from it an inference
of the fact may be reasonably drawn. B. SCHwATz, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, 657 (1977).
44. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 481-82, 488 (1951); AFL-CIO v.
Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 649 n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1979). In Universal Camera, the Court stated
that the requirement to take into account countervailing evidence did not alter the court's
fundamental duty to uphold the agency's choice between two conflicting views, "even
though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before
it de novo." 340 U.S. at 488. See also Palmer v. Celebrezze, 334 F.2d 306 (3rd Cir. 1964).
45. 383 U.S. 607 (1966).
46. Id. at 620, citing Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
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conclusions can be drawn from the same record, this does not necessitate the rejection of an OSHA regulation. An Agency determination can be suported by substantial evidence in the record as a
whole despite the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclu47
sions from that record.

Applying the substantial evidence test is problematic in two respects. First, the record of an informal rulemaking proceeding, incorporated in an OSHA regulation, is not as refined as that of a
formal procedure. This renders meaningful review difficult."8 Second, OSHA toxic substance regulation is essentially legislative in
character and is often based on policy objectives rather than empirical data. A stringent application of a substantial evidence standard to policy-dominated regulation possibly could preclude the
formulation of toxic substance regulations. Previous decisions applying the test to hazardous substance regulation have typically relied upon the expertise and knowledge of OSHA.
47. Id.; NLRB v. Nevada Consol. Copper Corp., 316 U.S. 105, 106 (1942); Keele Hair and
Scalp Specialists, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 18, 21 (5th Cir. 1960). Another formulation of substantial evidence is found in United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709 (1963),
where Justice Harlan said it is a "term of art to describe the basis on which an administrative record is to be judged by a reviewing court. This standard goes to the reasonableness of
what the agency did on the basis of the evidence before it." Id. at 715 (emphasis omitted).
Yet another formulation of the standard is that it is a test of the reasonableness not the
rightness of agency findings of fact. "Findings of fact cannot and will not be set aside if the
evidence in the record reasonably supports the administrative conclusion, even though suggested alternative conclusions may be equally or even more reasonable and persuasive." Colonial Stores v. FTC, 450 F.2d 733, 739 (5th Cir. 1971).
48. The inconsistency of pairing informal rulemaking with the "substantial evidence"
review standard was described in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 483 F.2d 1238,
1260 (D.C. Cir. 1973) as follows:
Informal comments simply create a record that satisfies the substantial evidence
test. Even if controverting information is submitted in the form of comments by
adverse parties, the procedure employed cannot be relied upon as adequate. A
"whole record".. . does not consist merely of raw data ...
it includes the process of testing and illumination ordinarily associated with adversary, adjudicative
procedures. Without this critical element, informal comments, even by adverse
parties, are two halves that do not make a whole.
The difficulty of reviewing a voluminous record was pointed out in Florida Peach Growers
Ass'n, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 129 (5th Cir. 1974), where the court said, "The
administrative record is comprised of some 238 documents occupying approximately two
and one half feet of shelf space. It includes such items as letters between Government officials, volumes of transcribed hearings, Senate hearings and committee reports ....
" See
also, AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 676 n.259 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted - U.S. (1980)(the court characterized the record as massive and unwieldy and offered the agency
constructive criticism).
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Judicial Deference to Policy Choices

The circuit courts, in reviewing OSHA hazardous and toxic substance standards, have generally deferred to OSHA's findings and
have upheld the challenged regulations." Although the courts have
recognized that both factual findings and policy choices must be
scrutinized under the substantial evidence standard, there has
been some disagreement over the level of scrutiny appropriate for
policy choices. In Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v.
Hodgson,50 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld
OSHA's asbestos standard. In so doing, the court acknowledged
that some of the issues which the regulation sought to address "are
on the frontiers of scientific knowledge." 6 1 The court further recognized that formulation of hazardous substance regulations necessitates policy choices which cannot be anchored securely in demonstrable fact.52 Therefore, the court concluded that regulations
based upon policy questions are not susceptible to the same kind
of verification as are factual questions."'
In AFL-CIO v. Marshall," the same court also deferred to
OSHA regulations governing the use of toxic substances in the
workplace. In upholding OSHA's cotton dust control regulation, 55
the court found the regulation was warranted by the evidence since
"OSHA's mandate necessarily requires it to act - even if information is incomplete - when the best available evidence indicates a

49. Am. Iron and Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3rd Cir. 1978); Society of the Plastics Indus. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1978); Synthetic Organic Mfr's. Ass'n v. Brennan, 506 F.2d 385 (3rd Cir. 1975); AFL-CIO v. Marshall,
617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, - U.S. - (1980).
50. 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974). This court rejected the claim that the substantial evidence test should apply only to factual determinations. Such a narrow stance would leave
the policy judgments behind a challenged health and safety standard reviewable only under
the "arbitrary and capricious" test. Id. at 473. Instead, the court concluded that policy inferences must not escape "exacting scrutiny" even though inferences cannot be strictly verified. Id. at 475. See also Associated Indus. v. Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 349 (2d Cir.
1973).
51. Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
52. Id. at 475. Furthermore, the court recognized that feasibility factors may be properly
considered by the Agency. Although such factors may not have the effect of tempering protective requirements, they would not necessarily alleviate financial burdens or prevent the
economic demise of an employer. Id. at 477.
53. Id. at 476.
54. 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
55. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1043 (1979). Exposure to cotton dust can cause serious health
hazards, the best known and most serious being "brown lung" disease or byssinosis. Cotton
dust is not classified as a carcinogen.
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serious threat to the health of workers."" The court did not fault
the Agency for formulating a regulation from a rulemaking record
riddled with scientific gaps and controversy. Rather, the court affirmed OSHA's overriding obligation to protect workers from occupational hazards and material health impairment.67
In American Iron and Steel Institute v. OSHA,58 the Third Circuit upheld OSHA's coke-oven emissions regulation.5 Finding substantial evidence that coke-oven emissions are carcinogenic at any
level of exposure, the court concluded that the decision to establish
a 0.15 mg/ms 60 exposure level "was a policy judgment on the basis
of the best available evidence as to what industry could achieve in
an effort to best protect its coke-oven employees." ' Furthermore,
the court stated that because a policy choice is a legislative decison
in the exercise of congressionally delegated powers, it need not be
supported by substantial evidence in the record.6 2 Thus, the Third
Circuit narrowed the application of the substantial evidence standard solely to determinations of factual issues that can be proven
by the record.
It is with this background that the Supreme Court faced the issues presented in Marshall v. American Petroleum Institute."
The Supreme Court rejected this past judicial analysis characterized by deference to OSHA's expertise. Instead, the Court fashioned a new analysis which places an increased burden upon
OSHA in sustaining a regulation governing the use of toxic and
hazardous substances in the workplace.

56. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, U.S._(1980). See also 29 U.S.C. § 655 (b)(5) (1976).
57. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, U.S.(1980).
OSHA's obligation to protect American workers despite deficiencies in research or methodology was also affirmed in Society of the Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975), where the court upheld OSHA's vinyl chloride
exposure standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1017 (1979). Vinyl chloride is an acknowledged carcinogen which is widely used in the plastics industry. Noting 13 known deaths in the record, the
court reminded industry that ".... we are dealing here with human lives." 509 F.2d at 1309,
58. 577 F.2d 825 (3rd Cir. 1978), cert. granted, - U.S._(1980).
59. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1029 (1979).
60. Among other requirements, the OSHA standard required that toxic emissions not
exceed 0.15 mg. of the benzene soluble fraction of total particulate matter per cubic meter
of air present during the production of coke averaged over an eight hour day. Am. Iron and
Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 827 (3rd Cir. 1978), cert. granted, - U.S. -(1980).
61. Id. at 833.
62. Id.
63. 48 U.S.L.W. 5022 (1980).
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THE DECISION:

Marshall v. American Petroleum Institute

Factual Background
Benzene has been recognized as a toxic substance since 1900,
and has a long history of regulation. 4 Since 1946, the American
Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists has reduced
benzene exposure limits from 100 ppm, to 50 ppm in 1947, 35 ppm
in 1948, 25 ppm in 1963, and 10 ppm in 1974. 6 These limits were
based on scientific evidence which linked benzene to serious blood
disorders." In 1969 the American National Standards Institute,
recognizing that benzene presents a serious health hazard to employees, adopted a national consensus standard 7 of 10 ppm averaged over an eight hour day." This standard was formally adopted
by OSHA in 1971.9 OSHA's adoption of the standard was based
on a finding that benzene had a non-malignant toxic effect rather
than any possible link to leukemia. 0
In 1977, however, as a result of new studies confirming the high
incidence of leukemia at high exposure levels7 ' and several recommendations from the National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health (NIOSH), 7 2 OSHA issued an emergency temporary
64.
65.
66.
67.
dard"

Am. Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 498 (5th Cir. 1978).
Id. See also Marshall v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 48 U.S.L.W. 5022,5024 (1980).
Id.
Section 3(9) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 652(9) (1976), defines a "national consensus stanas one "promulgated by a nationally recognized standards producing organization

In 1971, the Secretary adopted a large number of private consensus standards promulgated by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), an organization that has
served as a clearinghouse for the development of voluntary standards by agreement among
maker, seller, and user groups. ANSI is one of two private organizations which formulate
national consensus standards for commerce and industry. The other is the National Fire
Protection Association. The drafters of OSHA contemplated that the standards of these two
organizations would provide the vehicle for the Secretary's adoption of standards under §
6(a), 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1976). See S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in
[1970) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 5177, 5182.
68. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 498 (5th Cir. 1978).
69. Under the authority of 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1976), this standard was adopted without
rulemaking. Section 655(a) directs the Secretary, within 2 years after the effective date of
the Act and without rulemaking, to promulgate as an occupational safety or health standard
any national consensus standard that he determined would result in improved safety or
health for employees. The purpose of this power was to make the Act effective immediately.
On April 28, 1973, this power expired. Id.
70. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 498 (5th Cir. 1978).
71. Between 1974 and 1976, a number of studies were published tending to confirm that
benzene can cause leukemia when exposure levels are high. Marshall v. Am. Petroleum Inst.,
48 U.S.L.W. 5022, 5025 n.12 (1980).
72. The Act created the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
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standard reducing the benzene exposure limit from 10 ppm to 1
ppm. 7 3 This temporary standard met with fervent opposition from
industry. When it was challenged in the Fifth Circuit, the court
issued a temporary restraining order preventing the standard from
74
taking effect.
Subsequently, OSHA issued a proposal for a permanent standard very similar to the restrained temporary standard.7 5 The permanent standard also restricted skin contact with liquid benzene
and imposed labeling, exposure monitoring, and medical surveillance requirements.7 ' After public hearings were held and a
rulemaking record established, the final standard was issued, requiring industry to keep benzene exposure levels at or below 1
77
ppm.
. The American Petroleum Institute, on behalf of producers and
users of benzene and products containing benzene, challenged the
standard, alleging that OSHA failed to show that the reduced exposure level was "reasonably necessary" to provide a safe workplace. 78 The Institute argued that under the "reasonably necessary" language of section 3(8), OSHA was required to assess the
expected benefits of a regulation as compared to the anticipated
costs of compliance.7 9 OSHA, the Institute asserted, merely assumed that the benefits from the regulation may be appreciable.
Therefore, the Institute argued, the Agency's regulation was not
supported by substantial evidence.8 0
The Fifth Circuit's Decision
The Fifth Circuit invalidated OSHA's 1 ppm standard8 1 . In so
doing, the court parted with the pattern of judicial deference to
OSHA hazardous substance regulation. This decision differed from

to assist OSHA in carrying out its general purposes and in fulfilling the research and training provisions of the statute. 29 U.S.C. § 671 (1976). OSHA must consider all information
made available by interested parties and experts, so determinations of NIOSH are only one
factor in OSHA's deliberations. The Secretary is thus not bound by NIOSH recommendations. Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 476-77 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
73. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,516 (1977).
74. Marshall v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 48 U.S.L.W. 5026 (1980).
75. 42 Fed. Reg. 27,452 (1977).
76. Id.
77. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1028 (1979).
78. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 500 (5th Cir. 1978).
79. Id. at 501.
80. Id. at 503.
81. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978).
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the pre-Marshall decisions in three significant ways. First, the
court shed new light upon the "reasonable necessary" language of
section 3(8). 81 Previously, no circuit court had construed this language as placing substantive limits on OSHA's authority. The
Fifth Circuit, however, interpreted the "reasonably necessary" language to require a showing that: (1) a hazard exists in the working
environment; (2) the standard will reduce the risk of the hazard,
i.e. that measurable benefits will result; and (3) the expected bene88
fits bear a reasonable relationship to the expected costs.

82. Id. at 502-03. The American Petroleum court's construction of the "reasonably necessary" language of the OSHA statute was largely dependent on its earlier interpretation of
the same language in an entirely different statutory scheme, the Consumer Product Safety
Act (CPSA), 15 U.S.C. § 2051 et seq.. In Aqua Slide "N' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Product
Safety Commission, 569 F.2d 831, 844 (5th Cir. 1978), the Fifth Circuit construed the "reasonably necessary" language of that statute. The language appears in the section dealing
with the Consumer Product Safety Commission's process of setting standards. That statutory section requires specific findings that the Commission's rules are "reasonably necessary
to eliminate or reduce an unreasonable risk of injury." Am. Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581
F.2d 493, 502 (5th Cir. 1978), quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2058 (c)(2)(A). The American Petroleum
court found that OSHA's purpose of protecting workers from dangerous employment conditions is parallel to CPSA's purpose of protecting consumers from dangerous products and
reasoned that their precisely similar requirements cannot be construed to mean different
things. The Fifth Circuit's statutory construction limits OSHA's regulatory power to demonstrated, quantified, and unreasonable risks and requires a cost-benefit analysis of the regulated risks. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 502-503 (5th Cir. 1978).
OSHA has taken a broad interpretation of its feasibility constraint. In American Petroleum, OSHA argued that Congress imposed no substantive limits on its decisionmaking
power in the § 652(b)(8) definition, and that it is § 655(b)(5) which defines when conditions
imposed by a standard dealing with toxic materials are reasonably necessary. According to
OSHA, the requirement to assure "that no employee will suffer material impairment of
health" overcomes any cost requirements. 581 F.2d at 501-02.
The Fifth Circuit viewed feasibility as ultimately dependent on the reasonable relationship between the benefits and the costs because only when that relationship is reasonable
can a standard be said to be "reasonably necessary" under the Act. Id. at 503. It appears the
court assumed that the linquistic differences in the stated purposes of the two statutes are
immaterial; that OSHA's positively framed mandate to "assure so far as possible. . . safe
and healthful working conditions" is qualitatively equivalent to the CPSC's mandate to protect consumers from dangerous products.
The court's analogy to the Aqua Slide decision has been criticized as unpersuasive and
inappropriate by the D.C. Circuit in AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 665 n.169 (D.C.
Cir. 1979), cert. granted, - U.S. -(1980). For a detailed examination of the cost-benefit
analysis issue, and a persuasive argument that Aqua Slide was misapplied by the court, see
DeSanti, Cost Benefit Analysis for Standards Regulating Toxic Substances Under the Occupational Safety & Health Act, 60 B.U.L.R. 114, 129-30 (1980).
83. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 502-03 (5th Cir. 1978). The court emphasized two important features of its holding: (1) OSHA failed to show and factually assess
the benefits which would result from the standard, and (2) the expected benefits must bear
a reasonable relationship to the costs of compliance, which in this case was estimated to be
one-half billion dollars. Id.
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Second, the court substantially narrowed OSHA's policymaking
authority by requiring that OSHA regulate on a rulemaking record
based upon greater knowledge and fewer assumptions. 4 The practical result is a heavier evidentiary burden on the Agency because
a regulation controlling toxic substances must now be supported
by more statistical and scientific certainty before the Agency can
promulgate a new standard. Thus, the "frontiers of science" 85 and
"best available evidence" 6 analyses developed by previous circuit
courts have been greatly narrowed by the Fifth Circuit. The third
departure from pre-Marshall decisions, and one closely related to
the second, is the Fifth Circuit's insistence that both policy and
factual determinations made by the Agency must be carefully scru87
tinized under a substantial evidence test.
What the Court intended to accomplish through its new analysis
is difficult to ascertain. Perhaps the court sought to deprive OSHA
of any authority to make legislative judgment calls based on policy,
thereby confining OSHA's congressional mandate to regulatory
choices supported by conclusive factual findings. This reading of
the opinion certainly curtails OSHA's ability to regulate the use of
toxic substances in the working environment. In affirming the Fifth
Circuit's decision,8 8 the Supreme Court appears to have arrived at
the same conclusion.
The Supreme Court's Opinion
The Parties Arguments
Industry representatives offered a two-prong argument in urging
affirmation of the court of appeals decision. The first prong was
predicated on a reading of section 3(8).8 9 That section, argued the
industry, has separate legal significance and requires a showing
that the benzene standard was "reasonably necessary" to provide
safe and healthful employment. According to the industry, OSHA

84. Id. at 505.
85. See notes 50-53 supra and accompanying text.
86. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976). The best available evidence in an area of changing technology and incomplete scientific data may leave gaps in knowledge that require policy judgment in formulating the health and safety standard. See notes 54-57 supra and accompanying text.
87. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 497 (5th Cir. 1978). See text accompanying note 62 supra.
88. Marshall v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 48 U.S.L.W. 5022 (1980).
89. 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976).
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failed to make the required showing. 90
The second prong of the industry's attack was an alternative argument that under section 6(b)(5)91 OSHA does not have the authority to create risk-free workplaces regardless of cost. Rather,
prior to adopting a standard, OSHA must conduct a cost-benefit
analysis to determine whether or not the benefits of a regulation
are commensurate with the costs. The industry maintained that no
such analysis was undertaken by OSHA in its formulation of the
benezene standard."

OSHA advanced a contrary position." In its view, section 3(8)
has no substantive significance. It imposes no substantive limits on
the Agency's power, but allows the Agency to do whatever is
"reasonaly necessary" to eliminate all risks of harm from a workplace. As long as the standard is not totally irrational, it satisfies
the language of section 3(8)." OSHA further contended that section 6(b)(5) is controlling, and "requires OSHA to promulgate a
standard that either gives absolute assurance of safety for each and
every worker or that reduces exposures to the lowest level feasible."" OSHA's view of the feasibility requirement of section
6(b)(5) is that which is technologically achievable at a cost which
does not destroy the industry. 9" Confronted with these disparate
positions, the Supreme Court undertook the task of deciding
whether to uphold or strike down OSHA's revised benzene
standard.
90.
91.

Marshall v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 48 U.S.L.W. 5030 (1980).
29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).

92. Marshall v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 48 U.S.L.W. 5030 (1980)
93. OSHA's rationale, as characterized by the Court, is a series of assumptions consisting
of five main positions: (1) Benzene is a human carcinogen. (2) The burden of proof is on
industry to show a safe threshold level of exposure. (3) The Agency's standard policy with
respect to carcinogens is that in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, it is assumed
that no safe level exists, and therefore, any level of exposure above zero presents some increased risk of cancer. (4) Where no safe level is established, § 6(b)(5) requires OSHA to
select the lowest feasible level, and 1 ppm is workable because it is technologically feasible
and its cost impact will not threaten the welfare of the firms. (5) Some benefits are likely to
result from the reduced level because risk of leukemia must be assumed to decrease as exposure levels decrease, although it is not possible currently to construct a scientifically and
medically accurate dose and response curve, i.e. to plot levels of risk at various low levels of
exposure over a long time frame. Marshall v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 48 U.S.L.W. 5029-30
(1980).
94. Id. at 5030.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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The Supreme Court's Holding
Unlike the circuit courts which had previously reviewed OSHA
toxic substance regulations, 97 the Supreme Court refused to adopt
the "substantial evidence" standard of judicial review. 8 Instead,
the Court adopted a more stringent, less deferential analysis in reviewing OSHA action.
The Court posited that section 3(8) "does apply to all permanent
standards promulgated under the Act and that it requires the Secretary, before issuing any standard, to determine that it is reasonably necessary and appropriate to remedy a significant risk of material health impairment."' 99 The Court thus agreed with industry
that section 3(8) does have substantive legal content. Furthermore,
the Court stated that only after this "threshold determination" is
made would it be necessary to review the second argument:
"[whether, as OSHA contends,] section 6(b)(5) requires [the Secretary] to select the most protective standard he can consistent with
economic and technological feasibility, or whether, as [industry argues], the benefits of the regulation must be commensurate with
the costs of its implementation." 0 0 Finding that the Secretary had
failed to meet the section 3(8) threshold determination of reasonable necessity the Court concluded that it had no occasion to decide
the section 6(b)(5) issue.' 0 '
In holding that OSHA must satisfy the threshold test, the Court
reasoned that the Act empowers the Agency to issue standards to
provide safe and healthful employment, thereby implying that
OSHA must make a preliminary finding that a workplace is not
safe. 02 The Court further stated that "safe" does not mean riskfree, thus suggesting that a place or activity can pose some risks
but still be considered "safe."' 0 8 The Court concluded that "a
workplace can hardly be considered 'unsafe' unless it threatens the
97. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, _U.S._(1980);
Am. Iron and Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3rd Cir. 1978), cert. granted, - U.S. (1980); The Society of the Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA (2d Cir.) 509 F.2d 1301, cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109 (3rd Cir. 1975); Indus. Union
Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Associated Indus. of N.Y. State,
Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1973). See notes 49-62 supra and accompanying text.
98. Marshall v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 48 U.S.L.W. 5030 (1980).

99. Id.
100. Id.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id. at 5031.
Id.
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workers with a significant risk of harm."' Thus, prior to the promulgation of any permanent standard, the Secretary must make a
determination that the workplace presents a significant risk of detriment to the employee, and that the application of a permanent
standard will eliminate or lessen this risk.' 0 5 According to the
Court, the Secretary did not meet this requirement in the case
before it.
The Court characterized OSHA's 184 page rulemaking record as
"sketchy at best"' "obecause it failed to support the conclusion that
benzene presented a significant risk of harm to employees at the 10
ppm exposure level. OSHA did not quantify the risks of
nonmalignant blood disorders at the 10 ppm level and, did not
demonstrate how such disorders justified the regulation. Furthermore, the Court pointed out OSHA's failure to take a definitive
position as to what chromosomal aberrations meant in terms of demonstrable health effects. 107 Finally, the Court emphasized that
OSHA had produced no evidence that exposure to benzene at the
current 10 ppm level had ever caused leukemia. 0 8 Although one
study of 549 workers uncovered 3 leukemia deaths where worker
exposure to benzene was 2-9 ppm, the Court dismissed this study
as questionable because no leukemia deaths were uncovered among
workers exposed to higher benzene levels and because the three
workers' exposure to other carcinogenic chemicals could not be
ruled out. 10 9 On these factors, the Court concluded that the Agency
failed to show that benzene exposure at 10 ppm constituted a significant risk of material health impairment to an employee.

104.

Id.

105. Id.
106. Id. at 5028. The Court claimed that much of the 184 page explanation of the standard was devoted to the adverse effects of benzene exposure to benzene at levels of concentration well above 10 ppm, and therefore does not provide direct support for the Agency's
conclusion that the limit should be reduced from 10 ppm to 1 ppm. Id.
OSHA maintained that the lack of data regarding blood abnormalities made it impossible
to construct an accurate dose-response curve. Id. at 5029 n.38. In a footnote, the Court
suggested that OSHA at least should have discussed the possibility of a rough estimate or
extrapolation to derive risk estimates for low level exposures. Id. at 5028 n.33. Later, in the
text, the Court faulted the Agency for rejecting industry testimony that a dose-response
curve can be formulated. Id. at 5034.
107.

Id. at 5028-29.

108.

Id. at 5029.

109. Id.
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ANALYSIS

Statutory Fabrication
The Supreme Court's adoption of the "significant risk" standard
of section 3(8) seriously impinges OSHA's ability to control the use
of toxic substances in the workplace. The Court introduced a new
analysis which deviates considerably from the "substantial evidence" standard of review applied in the pre-Marshalldecisions.110
Although the Court's threshold requirement, which necessitates a
finding of a "significant risk," is based upon statutory construction,"' the plurality opinion offers neither persuasive reasoning
nor substantive support for its holding. Rather, the Court merely
announces what it perceives to be the intent of the statute.1 12 Unfortunately, such perception smacks of statutory fabrication rather
than true statutory interpretation.
The dissenting opinion in Marshall vigorously maintained that
both the statutory language and the legislative history of the Act
point to the conclusion that section 3(8) offers no substantive limitations on OSHA's rulemaking ability. " According to the dissent,
the limits on OSHA's power are found in section 6(b)(5) and in the
courts' application of the "substantial evidence" test.11 ' The dissent, therefore, concluded that the Court exceeded its proper judiand has changed the meaning and purpose of section
cial authority
15

3(8) .1

Predicating its analysis on statutory interpretation, the dissent
argued that at no time has section 3(8) imposed substantive limitations on the regulatory power of OSHA.116 The dissent also focused
110. The Court's opinion, unlike the pre-Marshall circuit court decisions, neither addresses nor defines its scope of judicial review. The Supreme Court's holding essentially
adopts industry's first prong argument which superimposes the substantive requirement of
significant health risk on the section 3(8) OSHA standard definition.
111. Id. at 5030. The Court posited that the meaning of and relationship between § 3(8)
and § 6(b)(5) are determinative and provide the statutory criteria for its holding. The Court
did not, however, identify what it believed the plain meaning of these statutory sections
might be, nor where the amgibuity justifying statutory construction arose.
112. The Court rejected OSHA's reading of the two sections, stating such reading would
be appropriate only if.OSHA's purpose were to eliminate all risks. The Act, however, does
not require "absolutely risk free workplaces." Id. at 5031.
113. Id. at 5044: "Nothing in the statute's language or legislative history, however, indicates that the 'reasonably necessary. . .' language should be given this meaning." The plurality, on the other hand, found that it is the requisite significant risk finding held implicit
in § 3(8) which empowers OSHA to regulate hazardous substances. Id. at 5031.
114. Id. at 5045.
115. Id. at 5049.
116. Id. The dissent pointed out that the definitional clause of § 3(8) received no legisla-
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on the legislative history and purpose of section 6(b)(5), 17 observing that this section was enacted to meet the special concerns arising from the use of toxic and hazardous substances in the workplace. Among these concerns are employee exposure to substances
that become dangerous only after frequent and prolonged exposure,11 8 the scientific uncertainty surrounding the use of many
toxic substances, 19 and the increasing use of carcinogens in a
chemically prolific society. 12 0 These concerns dictate that OSHA
have broad authority under section 6(b)(5). The plurality's holding, however, undermines these articulated legislative concerns. In
addition, the dissent argued that the plurality's imposition of a
new "significant risk" requirement nullifies the legislative policy
pertaining to health regulation contained in section 6(b)(5). 2 1 If
Congress had meant to saddle OSHA with this evidentiary burden,
it would have done so. Asserting that the decision substitutes judicial judgments for congressional ones, the dissent concluded that
policy judgments cannot be tolerated in the courtroom.""
A Barrier to Policy-Making
The "threshold test" developed by the Supreme Court deviates
significantly from the "substantial evidence" standard of judicial
review by more closely scrutinizing the conditions existing prior to
the promulgation of the OSHA regulation. Pursuant to the threshold test, the rulemaking record of OSHA must affirmatively support a finding of "significant risk" in the workplace. The substantial evidence standard, on the other hand, was characterized by
greater judicial deference to OSHA regulation. Although OSHA's
tive attention at all. While the standard setting provision of § 6(b)(5) received extensive
attention and was the object of much expressed concern, "[t]he definitional clause was not
mentioned at all, an omission that would be incomprehensible if Congress intended by that
clause to require the Secretary to quantify the risk he sought to regulate in order to demonstrate that it was 'significant.'" Id.
117. Id. at 5044.
118. Id. See also H.R. No. 1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 28 (1970).
119. Marshall v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 48 U.S.L.W. 5030, 5045 (1980). The provision requiring the Secretary to "act on the basis of the 'best available evidence' was intended to
ensure that the standard setting process would not destroyed by the uncertainty of scientific
views." Id.
120. Id. at 5044.
121. "The plurality's interpretation renders utterly superfluous the first sentence of §
655(b)(5) which . . . requires the Secretary to set the standard 'which most adequately assures.. . that no employee will suffer material impairment of health.' Indeed, the plurality's interpretation reads the sentence out of the Act." Id. at 5049.
122. Id. at 5053.
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actions were subjected to a "hard look"123 under the pre-Marshall
standard, validity was presumed as long as such actions were adequately supported by the rulemaking record. Furthermore, through
the application of the substantial evidence test, the circuit courts
12 4
have upheld OSHA regulations based on policy determinations.
The threshold test, however, leaves little room for regulations
based on policy judgments. Under the Marshall test, a court may
easily find that an inconclusive or scientifically controversial record
does not support the presence of a significant' risk. As a result,
OSHA regulations promulgated on the "frontiers of science" will
not withstand scrutiny.
The Supreme Court's threshold requirement will be particularly
difficult to overcome in carcinogen regulation. For example, in regard to the toxic substance benzene, hard scientific evidence concerning the long term effects of low-level exposure is either unavailable or controversial. OSHA cannot say with any degree of
certainty that benzene at 10 ppm produces a "significant risk" to
the worker. Yet, no proof exists that benzene does not present a
significant risk at this exposure level. In adopting its threshold requirement, the Supreme Court precludes OSHA from taking action
as a matter of legislative policy. OSHA can no longer advance overprotective regulation at industry's expense. Instead, the Supreme
Court mandates underprotective regulation at the expense of the
American worker.
A Demand for Risk Quantification
Another shortcoming of the Supreme Court's opinion in Marshall is its lack of instruction for future toxic substance regulation.
Nowhere in the 'opinion
does the Court define what it means by
"significant risk. 125
" Apparently, the Court assumes the language
conveys a level of risk that makes a workplace "unsafe" enough to
warrant regulation. Citing the coke-oven emissions risk assessment
as illustrative of how OSHA can properly demonstrate the risks
and benefits of regulating carcinogen exposure, 2 the Court reveals
123. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976), quoting Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
124. See notes 49-62 supra and accompanying text.
125. The Court, however, stated that the "significant risk" burden of proof is not a
"mathematical straitjacket" but is ultimately defined and determined by the Agency. Id. at
5034.
126.

Id. at 5035 n.64.
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its preference, even demand, for risk quantification.'2 7 Unfortunately, unlike the coke-oven emissons hazard, not all chemical exposure hazards lend themselves easily to certain and defensible
numbers. The Court did not face the dilemma of inconclusive, although reputable, scientific findings, and paid only lip service to
the policy basis of some risk determinations. In rejecting OSHA's
policy-dominated benzene standard, the Court has also indirectly
rejected the Agency's carcinogen policy articulated by the Secretary as the policy determination which underlies the reduced ben128
zene exposure level.
The opinion does provide insight into the Court's underlying
concerns, namely OSHA's "unprecedented power over American
industry" and the potentially enormous compliance costs imposed
on industry.12 ' Given the thousands of suspect carcinogens in existence, the Court fears a carcinogen policy which would permit pervasive regulation with few measurable benefits. The Court's fear,
however, is misdirected. Rather than focusing on compliance cost
burdens, Congress focused on the staggering economic impact of
industrial disabilities and deaths.8 0 The express goal of Congress
in enacting OSHA was to compel industrial investment in the
health of American workers.
CONCLUSION

By preventing OSHA from regulating risks it cannot first statis-

127. The dissent, however, recognized "encouraging signs" that the Secretary is not totally foreclosed from action where risk quantification simply cannot be undertaken. Id. at
5050.
128. OSHA's proposed generic cancer policy was promulgated October 4, 1977. 42 Fed.
Reg. 54,148 (1977). OSHA adopted this formal policy for regulating carcinogens, effective
April 21, 1980. 45 Fed. Reg. 5002 (1980). Justice Powell, in his partially concurring opinion,
observed in a footnote that the policy was not in effect when the Agency issued the benzene
regulation. He further noted that no properly supported Agency policy was before the Court
in this case. Marshall v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 48 U.S.L.W. 5022, 5037 n.3 (1980). The plurality also made a footnote reference to the generic cancer policy after its statement regarding
OSHA's potential power to impose enormous costs with few attendant benefits. Id. at 5032
n.51.
This cancer standard is now being challenged in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, No. 80-3018. OSHA asked the circuit court to stay
proceedings until certain revisions are made to conform its standard to the Supreme Court's
benzene decision. See 10 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REPORTER (BNA) 795 (1980).
129. Id. at 5032. Although the Court does not expressly address the issue of cost-benefit
analysis, it articulates the cost-benefit considerations in the very language it uses and in its
frequent references to enormous costs and small benefits.
130. S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Seas. 4, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws, 5180.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 12

tically characterize as "significant," the Supreme Court sharply
curtails OSHA's rulemaking power. The Marshall decision thus
writes out of the statute and legislative history a realm of risks
Congress intended OSHA to regulate. Through adoption of its
threshold test, the Court establishes a new model of intrusive and
stringent judicial review of agency health regulation. The "significant risk" requirement precludes OSHA from regulating on predictive or precautionary policy grounds since OSHA can regulate only
after hazards are recognized and, to some extent, quantified.
OSHA's rulemaking efforts are especially hampered in areas of
scientific uncertainty, most notably the regulation of carcinogens.
OSHA has taken the policy position that no "safe" human exposure level can be determined for carcinogens. The Marshall decision suggests future regulation based on OSHA's controversial carcinogen policy, which has now been formally promulgated as a
regulation, will be invalidated when challenged in the courts.
The Court's splintered opinion in Marshall is also disturbing because it demonstrates how easily the Supreme Court can, without
agreement on such basic issues as the determination of acceptable
risks, redefine the regulatory scope and power of an administrative
agency whose rulemaking authority is grounded on protectionist
policy judgments. The decision to invalidate the tough benzene
standard, while an apparent victory for industry in its express endorsement of risk analysis, provides little direction for OSHA in
fulfilling its objective of ensuring workers' safety and health. The
Supreme Court must now assist OSHA in determining how much
it may ask industry to spend in the future for the protection of the
American worker.
SOPHIA CHRUSCIEL

